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Pulled, Pushed, and Persuaded: Explaining
Women’s Mobilization into the Salvadoran
Guerrilla Army
1
Jocelyn S. Viterna
Tulane University
Using a rare representative sample of grassroots activists and non-
activists, this study identiﬁes three paths that consistently led Sal-
vadoran women to involvement in the FMLM guerrilla army: po-
liticized guerillas, reluctant guerillas, and recruited guerillas. These
mobilization paths arose from the patterned intersections of indi-
vidual-level biographies, networks, and situational contexts. The
implications of these ﬁndings extend beyond studies of revolutionary
activism to analyses of microlevel mobilization in general. Activists
are heterogeneous and often follow multiple paths to the same par-
ticipation outcome. Capturing these multiple paths is imperative for
generating theoretically sound explanations of mobilization that
are also empirically effective in distinguishing activists from
nonactivists.
Popular support is often considered the sine qua non of revolution (Wick-
ham-Crowley 1992, p. 52). Nevertheless, there is little consensus among
scholars about which causal factors are most important for generating
popular mobilization (Kriger 1992). Some scholars portray popular par-
ticipants as aggrieved individuals who become mobilized when structural
conditions—for example, weak states, elite divisions, agrarian arrange-
1 This project was funded with a Fulbright-Hays Fellowship from the U.S.Department
of Education, an International Pre-dissertation Fellowship from the Social Science
Research Council, support from the Indiana University Department of Sociology, and
the P.E.O. Scholars Program. Sections of this article were presented at the 2003 and
2004 meetings of the American Sociological Association and at Tulane University. I
thank Jason Beckﬁeld, Kent Redding, Rob Robinson, Clem Brooks, Sheldon Stryker,
Amy Hite, Katy Fallon, Doug Massey, and the AJS reviewers for their helpful com-
ments. I also thank the many Salvadorans who participated in this project. Direct
correspondence to Jocelyn Viterna, Department of Sociology, Tulane University, 220
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ments, or socioeconomic dislocations—are conducive to activism (Gold-
stone 1991; Paige 1975; Scott 1976; Skocpol 1979). For others, popular
participants are rational actors who see opportunities for personal gain
through revolutionary activism (Migdal 1974; Popkin 1979). Some schol-
ars portray grassroots participants as identifying deeply with the ideals
and goals of the movement because of their preexisting network mem-
berships (Bearman 1993; Gould 1995; Pfaff 1996; Wickham-Crowley
1992). Still others depict participants as unwilling supporters of the cause,
coerced to participate by threats of harm, denial of needed goods, or a
lack of options to avoid activism (Goodwin 2001; Kriger 1992; Loveman
1998).
Yet, of the many individuals experiencing structural changes, of the
many individuals in position to beneﬁt from revolutionary activism, of
the many individuals embedded in identity-molding mobilizing networks,
and of the many individuals caught in coercive situations, only a few
actually participate in revolutionary movements. Herein lies the dilemma:
if the characteristics that explain activism are shared by activists and
nonactivists, then how can these characteristics be the critical causal fac-
tors behind popular mobilization? If they are not, what additional—or
alternative—factors explain why some, but not all, members of a group
or network take part in high-risk revolutionary activism?
Questions about the causes of revolutionary mobilization remain un-
resolved because mobilization scholars generally seektheonecausalfactor
or set of factors that “typically” leads individuals to activism. These ex-
planations assume that activists are a largely homogenous group who
generally follow one path to participation. But activists are heterogeneous
(McAdam 1992; Wiltfang and McAdam 1991) and, as I demonstrate, can
follow strikingly different paths to the same mobilization outcome. For
example, the same causal factor that promotesmobilizationinsomepeople
may actually inhibit mobilization in others. In this case, searching for the
“typical” mobilization pattern obscures an important causalfactorbecause
its contradictory effects cannot be captured in a generalized explanation
of all activism. These generalized explanations can therefore lead to in-
accurate explanations of mobilization and distort our understanding of
broader revolutionary processes.
In this article, I develop a novel theoretical approach for analyzing
microlevel mobilization that complements mesolevel and macrocompar-
ative studies. I argue that there are multiple, conjunctural causes of mo-
bilization, even among individuals embedded within similar identity-
producing networks and within similar structuralcontexts.Thesemultiple
paths to participation arise from the patterned interaction of individual-
level biography, networks, and situational context. Because mobilization
processes are patterned, scholars can identify the different paths thatWomen’s Mobilization
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individuals follow to participation while still prioritizing parsimonious
explanations. My analysis shows that distinguishing microlevel variation
in participation processes yields more accurate theories of high-risk ac-
tivism and, in turn, improves our macrolevel understanding of the causes,
successes, failures, and unintended consequences of popular revolutionary
mobilization.
The case of women revolutionaries in El Salvador illustrates the utility
of this approach. In the 1980s, thousands of Salvadoran women joined
the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN), a revolutionary
guerrilla army engaged in combat with the oppressive Salvadoran state.
These women, like their counterparts around the world, deﬁedpatriarchal
traditions, abandoned their homes and families, and became militant
members of rural guerrilla insurgencies.
2 By analyzing the multiple paths
that Salvadoran women followed to the guerrilla camps, I reﬁne existing
explanations of women’s revolutionary participation and suggest how
these new insights may have important implications for macrolevel pro-
cesses such as democratization and broader transformations in gendered
rights and relations.
My conclusions are based on analysis of rich data from in-depth in-
terviews with 82 female rank-and-ﬁle guerrilla combatants, guerrilla sup-
porters, and nonparticipants in rural El Salvador. These data have two
key advantages. First, they include the experiences of the grassroots,
whereas most mobilization studies focus solely on movement leadership.
Second, they allow for comparisons between activists and similarly sit-
uated nonactivists, whereas most studies sample on the dependent vari-
able and omit nonactivists. This rare representative sample of activists
and nonactivists is uniquely suited to the identiﬁcation of the multiple
paths to activism that deepen sociological understandings of mobilization.
THEORIZING MICROLEVEL MOBILIZATION PROCESSES IN
REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENTS
Scholars of revolution typically identify the macrolevel conditions con-
ducive to mobilizing popularsupport. Manysuggestthattherevolutionary
potential of aggrieved peasants is consistently present across place and
time and becomes activated when certain political, historical, or economic
conditions emerge. For example, they ﬁnd that modernization and com-
2 In Latin America alone, large numbers of women have participated in left-wing
guerrilla movements in Nicaragua, Guatemala, the Chiapas (Mexico), Colombia, and
Peru. Around the world, women have been militant, antistate activists in such diverse
nations as Russia (in Chechnya), Eritrea, Iraq (especially the Kurdish region), Nepal,
Sri Lanka, and Zimbabwe.American Journal of Sociology
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mercialization bring institutional imbalancesin societyandresultinweak-
ened states (Skocpol 1979, 1994), a disrupted “moral economy” (Scott
1976), or increased participation incentives for rational, cost-calculating
individuals (Popkin 1979). Others search for the group most likely to
become revolutionary and argue, for example, that landless peasants
(Paige 1975), or landowning middle peasants (Wolf 1969), are most likely
to revolt. Macrolevelstudiesthusanswerimportantquestionsaboutwhere
and when revolutions may occur, but cannot explain why mostindividuals
embedded in these “revolutionary” social locations or political-historical
contexts do not, in fact, revolt. Thus, macrolevel models only take us so
far in understanding the causes of revolution.
Scholars employing network analysis to explain revolutionary mobili-
zation help connect macrolevel contexts to microlevel mobilization pro-
cesses, as individuals interpret their larger social context through the
networks in which they are embedded (Calhoun 1991). Peter Bearman
(1993), for example, demonstrates how religious rhetoric in England cre-
ated new social networks among elites, and that these new networks
corresponded with revolutionary activity. Steven Pfaff (1996) analyzes the
role of small-scale social networks in generating the peaceful revolution
against the communist regime in East Germany in 1989. Timothy Wick-
ham-Crowley (1992) argues that political, religious, and family networks
were critical for mobilizing Latin Americans into leftist guerrilla move-
ments. Roger Gould (1995) demonstrates that the spatial proximity of
individuals within a network is also critical to their mobilization.
Network analyses of revolutionary participation parallel a long tradi-
tion in the social movement literature that argues interests alone cannot
move people to participate in movements (Briet, Klandermans,andKroon
1987; Henig 1982; Klandermans 1984; Olson 1965; Walsh 1988).
3 Rather,
interests must be embedded in structured social relations that highlight
them as important and worthy of action (Emirbayer and Goodwin 1994;
Stryker 2000). A number of empirical studies demonstrate the importance
of preexisting networks for mobilizing social action at the microlevel (see,
e.g., Briet et al. 1987; Fernandez and McAdam 1988; Gould 1995; Kim
and Bearman 1997; Klandermans and Oegema 1987; McAdam 1986;
3 Speciﬁcally, interest-based explanations cannot explain why some injustices lead to
action and others do not, or why some aggrieved individuals participate in movements
while others sit back and allow the activists to ﬁght for all similarly aggrieved people
(i.e., Olson’s [1965] “free-rider” problem).Women’s Mobilization
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McAdam and Paulsen 1993; Snow, Zurcher, and Ekland-Olson 1980).
4
Such networks are particularly important for mobilization into high-risk
forms of collective action, because a high degree of trust helps counteract
the selective disincentives to participate in dangerous activities (della
Porta 1988; Loveman 1998; McAdam 1986; Morris 1984).
Problems arise, however, because social network studies, like macro-
level studies of revolutionary mobilization, tend to be overly deterministic
(McAdam 2000, p. xii). Movement participants are traced to a common
network, but the failure of others embedded within the same network to
participate is seldom acknowledged or analyzed.
Social psychological theories of identity-based mobilization processes
provide insight into why networks mobilize some, but not all, of their
members (Emirbayer and Goodwin 1994; McAdam 2000; Stryker 2000).
According to these theories, individuals must develop a salient “partici-
pation identity” prior to mobilizing; that is, being a participant must
become so important to a person’s sense of self that to not participate
would cause psychological and emotional harm.Inaddition,thesescholars
demonstrate that multiple identities are always competing for salience,
even among people embedded in a common network. For example, a
person’s identity as “mother” may compete with a potential movement
participation identity, especially if participation in the movement could
jeopardize the woman’s ability to be a good mother, and therefore her
identity as a mother. Both identities may be important to the woman’s
sense of self, and both identities arise from social networks, but it is the
interaction of these network-based identities with each other and with
still other competing identities that determines whether the participation
identity becomes salient enough to result in action (Stryker 2000). Being
in a participation-supporting network therefore increases an individual’s
probability of mobilization, but does not guarantee it.
Very few studies model empirically the effects of overlapping networks
on mobilization decisions. Of particular note, McAdamandPaulsen(1993)
compared the social ties of both participants and nonparticipants in the
Freedom Summer movement. They ﬁnd that social ties inhibit as well as
promote high-risk activism, and that intimate social ties are of greater
importance for mobilization than more distant social ties. They also ﬁnd
4 Interests, especially categorical interests such as class, race, and gender,remaincentral
to the concept of mobilizing networks. However, they are usually in combination with
more ﬁnite social organizations. For example, Tilly’s (1978) adaptation of Harrison
White’s CATNET table shows how categorical membership can intersect with social
network patterns to create extraordinary collective action potential, and McAdam’s
(1992) analysis of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee found that gender
signiﬁcantly affected recruitment decisions by movement leaders within targeted re-
cruitment networks.American Journal of Sociology
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that a person’s “biographical availability,” as determined by their edu-
cation, gender, income, age, marital status, and occupation, affects par-
ticipation decisions. People with fewer family and work responsibilities
are more likely to participate. Nepstad and Smith (1999) tested the
McAdam and Paulsen model with similar data from the high-risk Nic-
aragua Exchange movement. They conﬁrm the importance of network
ties, but question the importance of biographical availability; many re-
spondents participated despite biographical barriers to mobilization.
Combining these ﬁndings with social psychological theories, I suggest
that micro-level mobilization into high-risk activism can be modeled ac-
cording to the following theoretical equation:
net influence of all networks
the net influence of all biographical barriersp
the probability of high-risk activism,
where the ﬁrst factor is the sum of a number of networks, each with its
own inﬂuence on the participation identity in question. Some of these
networks may positively support the identity of the participant, while
others may reject participation (McAdam and Paulsen 1993). The mag-
nitude of each network’s inﬂuence on the emergence of a salient partic-
ipation identity increases or decreases according to (1) the numberofsocial
ties encompassed in the network, and (2) the emotional strength and
spatial proximity of these ties (Stryker 2000; Gould 1995). The ﬁrst factor
in the equation, the net inﬂuence of all network ties, is a necessary re-
quirement for mobilization; a person cannot be moved to activismwithout
meaningful network ties that support the identity of the participant. The
impact of the second factor is debated; biographical barriers to partici-
pation may be overcome in cases where the individual’s participation
identity is salient enough to overcome competing identities.
THEORIZING MICROLEVEL MOBILIZATION PROCESSES FOR
WOMEN GUERRILLAS
During the 1970s and 1980s, the number of women joining high-risk,
militant, and indeed “masculine” revolutionary campaigns in Latin Amer-
ica increased dramatically.
5 To illustrate: when the FMLN guerrilla army
laid down its weapons and reorganized as a political party in El Salvador
under the 1992 peace accords, fully 30% of its approximately 13,000 of-
5 For discussions of how waging war is a gendered process, see El-Bushra and Piza
Lopez (1994), El-Bushra and Mukarubuga (1995), Enloe(1990),Skaine(1999),Wechsler
Segal (1995), and Wickham-Crowley (1992, pp. 21–23).Women’s Mobilization
7
ﬁcially “demobilized” members were women (Luciak 2001; Va ´zquez, Iba ´-
n ˜ez, Murguialday 1996). In Nicaragua and Guatemala, women were also
estimated to make up 30% of the guerrilla armies (Chinchilla 1983; New
Americas Press 1989; Thomson 1986), and in Peru, one-half of all Sendero
Luminoso combatants were estimated to be female (McClintock quoted
in Wickham-Crowley 1992). Furthermore, women, while never gaining
equal status to men, did occupy signiﬁcant leadership roles in guerrilla
armies, including as battalion commanders and political liaisons (Chin-
chilla 1983; Reif-Lobao 1986; Ueltzen 1993). Several all-female units
fought in direct combat with all-male, highly trained government forces
(Saywell 1985; Thomson 1986).
To date, scholars have questioned why women entered guerrilla armies
in the 1970s and 1980s and not in earlier movements of the 1950s and
1960s.
6 They answer that changes in Latin American social and economic
structures led to men’s out-migration and eventual abandonment of their
families, and to a corresponding increase in the number of impoverished
female heads of household (Kampwirth 2002; Mason 1992; Reif-Lobao
1986, 1998).
7 Women responded by moving into the paid labor force and
mobilizing their communities around speciﬁcally women’s interests (e.g.,
child care or familial nutritional needs). These new experiences in the
labor force and in community politics increased women’s contact with
individuals and issues outside of the family and thus increased their po-
tential for revolutionary mobilization.
All scholars highlight how changing structural conditions pushed
women into new public roles, but early studies disagree on the catalyst
that encouraged newly active women to join guerrilla armies. Reif-Lobao
(1986, 1998) argues that new revolutionary ideologies combined with the
global diffusion of feminist thought and encouraged political groups’ re-
6 According to Wickham-Crowley (1992), very few women became involved in the
“ﬁrst wave” of antigovernment guerrilla armies of the 1950s and 1960s, and those who
did were largely relegated to support roles for male combatants. By the “second wave”
movements of the 1970s and 1980s, however, women’s participation differed substan-
tially from the earlier movements in both number and in form. Wickham-Crowley
states that “in no other fashion does the second wave of guerrillas differ so thoroughly
from the ﬁrst wave” than through the burgeoning numbers of women in their ranks
(Wickham-Crowley 1992, p. 215).
7 Reif-Lobao (1986, 1998) analyzed women guerrillas in Cuba, Colombia, Uruguay,
Nicaragua, and El Salvador; Mason (1992) compared women’s guerrilla activism in
Nicaragua and El Salvador; and Kampwirth (2002) interviews women revolutionaries
in Mexico, Nicaragua, and El Salvador.American Journal of Sociology
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cruitment of women.
8 Mason (1992) argues that women’s aboveground
organizing was met with extreme repression from the state, and this re-
pression in turn pushed women to clandestine political mobilization for
survival (see also Wickham-Crowley 1992). Regardless, both agree that
women were mobilized as guerrillas because they ﬁrst assumed new “mas-
culine” roles such as household heads, paid laborers, andpoliticalactivists,
and yet maintained their “feminine” prioritization of child care, household
survival, and social welfare. By extension, both suggest that women who
were mothers, workers, and activists were rationally drawn to guerrilla
movements.
9 This argument parallels a large body of research that sug-
gests women activists often legitimize their actions against the state by
framing those actions as an integral component of their maternal re-
sponsibilities (Ferree and Mueller 2004).
10
Recently, Kampwirth (2002) enhanced our understanding of women’s
guerrilla mobilization with individual-level interview data. Like previous
studies, she ﬁnds that large-scale structural changes and international
feminism generated new forms of women’s activism. She expands on
8 Revolutionary leaders were moving from a Guevara-inspired “foquismo” ideology,
where a small group of revolutionaries was sufﬁcient to inspire mass rebellion and
rapid overthrow of the ruling regime, to a more Maoist understanding of a “prolonged
people’s war,” where the support of the oppressed population over many years was
necessary for the gradual wearing away of a long-oppressive regime. Reif-Lobao(1986)
also argued in her earlier work that guerrilla groups conscientiously fostered women’s
participation by directly addressing women’s issues through their internal organiza-
tional structures. Speciﬁcally, they worked toward abolishing the sexual division of
labor, and they provided child and health care for guerrilla participants. This conten-
tion is dropped in her later article (Reif-Lobao 1998), however, likely in response to
works like Murguialday (1996), Murguialday, Olivera, and Va ´squez (1997), and Va ´z-
quez et al. (1996), which suggest that guerrilla camps, contrary to the early egalitarian
rhetoric espoused by movement leaders, were in reality highly sexist in their division
of labor and rules about sexual practices.
9 Va ´zquez et al. also suggests that motherhood may be a mobilizer, as mothers some-
times followed their older sons and daughters into guerrilla activism (Va ´zquez et al.
1996, pp. 108–9).
10 Motherhood often serves as both a collective identity and a collective action frame
for women who participate in social and revolutionary movements (Molyneux 1985;
Ferree and Mueller 2004). As a collective identity, motherhood allows women to de-
velop a sense of “we-ness” with other women, even across political lines (Bayard de
Volo 2001). As a collective action frame, mobilizing as mothers is not only strategically
effective, but it also provides women some initial protection against state-sponsored
violence. See, for example, Bouvard’s (2002) discussion of “revolutionizing mother-
hood” in the Plaza de Mayo in Argentina, Naples’s (1998) study of “activist mothering”
in the U.S. war on poverty, and Noonan’s (1995) analysis of women’s anti-Pinochet
protesting in Chile. Neuhouser (1995) found that the gendered division of labor shaped
both strategies and outcomes in social movements in a Brazilian squatter community.
Bayard de Volo (2001) provides a particularly nuanced discussion of the complex
relationship between revolution and motherhood.Women’s Mobilization
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previous studies by arguing that family activism networks and newly
emerging political and religious organizations were the agents of these
new peaceful mobilizations. These new mobilizations were then speciﬁ-
cally targeted by state repression, and state repression was the catalyst
forcing peaceful activists into clandestine guerrilla organizations. Kamp-
wirth also analyzes the importance of biographical barriers to partici-
pation and ﬁnds that mothers were less likely to join revolutionary move-
ments than nonmothers. This contradicts earlier studies that ﬁnd that
women household heads constituted the “typical” guerrilla (Mason 1992;
Reif-Lobao 1986; see also Va ´zquez et al. 1996).
Kampwirth’s analysis of women’s guerrilla participation suggests that
the mobilization path that women follow to guerrilla camps is initially
very similar to the mobilization path that most participants follow in any
type of social movement. Participation-supporting network ties intersect
with high levels of biographical availability and result in women’s par-
ticipation in peaceful political organizations. However, when government
repression targets peaceful activists, these activists are then forced into
clandestine armed combat (Kampwirth 2002; see also Mason 1992). Bor-
rowing from this analysis, I add the effects of state-sponsored repression
to the heuristic mobilization equation above and suggest that theories of
women’s guerrilla mobilization can be modeled as follows:
net influence of all networks
the net influence of all biographical barriersp
the probability of movement activism,
and then
movement activism state-sponsored repression p
guerrilla activism,
where, as in the earlier equation, networks are considered indispensable,
and biographical barriers surmountable.
PUTTING THEORY INTO PRACTICE
Existing theory, as modeled in the above equations, allows for the pos-
sibility that different processes may lead different individuals to the same
mobilization outcome. One type of network might matter for some in-
dividuals but not for others, some networks might be important at one
point in a person’s life but not at another, or some networks might affect
mobilization only in particular combinations. Nevertheless, micromobil-
ization researchers in practice generally seek the one pattern that mostAmerican Journal of Sociology
10
closely approximates the mobilization experienceofallindividuals.Iargue
that this search for the “typical” path to activism erroneously imposes
uniform explanations on what is in reality an integrative, conjunctural,
and varied mobilization process.
The case of women’s guerrilla mobilization illustrates the necessity of
identifying the multiple paths people follow to mobilization.Conventional
explanations of women’s guerrilla activism do not take into account the
different ways that social networks, biographical characteristics, and sit-
uational contexts may interact. For example, scholars identify repression
as important for women’s guerrilla mobilization, but they fail to account
for how the context ofrepressionchangesoverthecourseofthemovement,
or how repression affects individuals differently based on theirindividual-
level biographies and network memberships.
Findings of uniformity in women’s guerrilla mobilization, like ﬁndings
of uniformity in other studies of mobilization, may be a product of the
data employed. Researchers have studied only guerrillas; they have not
gathered data that allow for comparisons with their nonguerrilla coun-
terparts.
11 Moreover, the guerrillas chosen for investigation have been
selected almost exclusively from an elite subset of guerrillas: urban, mid-
dle-to-upper class, educated, and active in present-day movement orga-
nizations (Kampwirth 2002; Kriger 1992; Va ´zquez et al. 1996). Other
research (Byrne 1996, p. 35; McClintock 1998, pp. 266–67; Paige 1997,
p. 379, n. 49), as well as my own interviews, indicate that most women
in FMLN camps were poor, uneducated, and from rural areas, and that
nearly half did not remain active in civil society after the war was over.
The experiences of the majority—who may have experienced entirely
different paths to guerrilla mobilization—have been largely ignored.
In the following analysis, I use the case of women guerrillas in El
Salvador to develop a new approach to micromobilization that allows for
multiple, conjunctural paths to participation. I do so by employing better
data and analyzing the dynamic interaction of network-based identities,
biographical barriers, and situational contexts for each respondent. I ﬁnd
that Salvadoran women followed three distinct paths to guerrillaactivism:
I call them politicized guerrillas, reluctant guerrillas, and recruited
guerrillas.
11 Nearly all social movement researchers only study movement activists (and not
nonactivists) and thus are guilty of sampling on the dependent variable. Notable
exceptions include McAdam (1992), McAdam and Paulsen (1993), and Nepstad and
Smith (1999).Women’s Mobilization
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DATA
The data for this study are interviews conducted between September2001
and May 2002 with 82 rural Salvadoran women.
12 To ensure a represen-
tative group of both guerrilla and nonguerrilla women for interviews, I
ﬁrst selected six villages from three different municipios that were in-
cluded on a United Nations list of the 25 municipios most violently dis-
puted during the 12-year civil war (see ﬁg. 1). A municipio is similar to
a U.S. county or parish in that it is a politically bounded geographicregion
that incorporates a number of smaller villages. The six villages were
chosen to represent all ﬁve ideological branches of the FMLN and three
distinct geographical regions. They range in size from 300 to 1,000
inhabitants.
I hired assistants from each community to administer a survey of all
households in each village (or a random subset of households in the two
largest villages). The short survey asked how many adults lived in each
home, what their ages were, and whether or not any of them lived and
worked in the guerrilla camps during the civil war. I used the survey
results to select 14 women, seven guerrillas and seven nonguerrillas, from
each community to interview. The guerrillas were selected at random,
and the nonguerrillas were selected to match the ages of the chosen guer-
rillas as closely as possible. My resulting group of respondents is highly
representative of the full population of the six villages in terms of age
and participation distributions (details available upon request). Only one
of the initially identiﬁed individuals (1.2%) refused to be interviewed; she
was replaced with another woman ofthe sameageandparticipationstatus
who in turn complied.
13 Interviews with four formerhigh-rankingmilitary
ofﬁcials within the FMLN guerrilla army provide additional information
about recruitment practices.
14
12 I focus on women in part because gender has been shown to affect microlevel
mobilization patterns in high-risk social movements (Irons 1998; McAdam 1992); fo-
cusing exclusively on women therefore allows me to create a baseline model capturing
heterogeneity among activists. Moreover, the atypical nature of women’s guerrilla
participation has generated more academic inquiry into micromobilization processes
than has the participation of men, and thus provides a broader theoretical base from
which to build my model.
13 Interviewing 14 women in each of six communities initially generated 84 interviews.
However, two of the original 84 interviews were dropped from this analysis, resulting
in my reported N of 82. The ﬁrst woman was 19 at the time of the interview, which
would have made her only eight years old when the peace accords were signed in
1992, and too young to remember well the events of the 1980s. The second was dropped
because a technical glitch resulted in an unrecorded interview.
14 Of the four, two were women, two were men, and each represented a different
ideological branch of the FMLN. These interviews were conducted by an assistant
with ties to the FMLN, recorded, and transcribed in their entirety.Fig. 1.—Research locationsWomen’s Mobilization
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To gain respondents’ trust prior to conducting the interviews, I lived
in each community for a period of one to two months, usually in the home
of a female council member. I actively took part in daily activities such
as washing clothes, hauling water, harvesting corn, and making tortillas.
Salvadorans responded very positively to this research project. In fact, I
had more difﬁculty explaining to nonselected individuals why I was not
going to interview them than I had convincing selected respondents to
participate. Respondents were not compensated for their participation; by
contrast, many insisted on preparing and sharing a meal with me after
our interview was complete. Interviews were usually conducted on the
front patio of the respondent’s home, distanced from other adults in the
household. The shortest interviews lasted about 90 minutes and the long-
est about eight hours over two separate afternoons. Interview questions
asked about basic demographic information; opinions about politics, com-
munity, gender, and society; present-day activities; and histories of war-
time experiences. All interviews were conducted in Spanish and were
recorded and later transcribed. I conducted 80% of the interviews myself,
and trained assistants conducted 20%.
This study, like most analyses of past social processes in developing
nations, depends on people’s recollections about prior experiences.
15 An-
alyzing retrospective data requires some caution because present-day re-
ports of the past can be malleable (Auyero 1999; Schwartz 1997; Sudman,
Bradburn, and Schwarz 1996; Zerubavel 1996).
16 In addition to basic
recall difﬁculties, respondents’ accounts of the past may be inﬂuenced by
their present-day identities, especially given that movement participation
itself may cause identity shifts (Calhoun 1994; Larana, Johnston, and
Gusﬁeld 1994).
To address the ﬁrst concern, accuracy of recall, I structured my ques-
tionnaire around past events rather than past attitudes because memories
of events are more reliable (Markus 1986; Schacter 1996). For example,
I asked each respondent where she lived during the war, who she lived
with, whether she left her home for a refugee camp, and so forth. Research
15 Most grassroots participants in the Salvadoran revolutionary movement were illit-
erate or only slightly literate and left few written records during the war. A few
government agencies and researchers conducted surveys of rural Salvadorans during
the 1980s, but respondents were often unwilling to provide personal information to
unknown questioners during this politically violent time (Wood 2003, p. 32).
16 Nevertheless, many sociological ﬁelds concur that retrospective reports of behavior
and events generate valid results when used appropriately. See, for example, studies
of immigration (Massey and Zenteno 2000), life course (Scott and Alwin 1998), or-
ganizations (Miller, Cardinal, and Glick 1997), and mobility (Blau and Duncan 1967).
In El Salvador, Elisabeth Wood (2003) provides a nuanced discussion of how retro-
spective data allows for new insights into campesinos’ participation in land seizures
and agricultural cooperatives.American Journal of Sociology
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shows that more salient, less repetitive events are remembered with par-
ticular accuracy (Scott and Alwin 1998, p. 114; Becket et al. 2000), and
that highly intense or violent events (such as those reported by my re-
spondents) are especially well remembered in both the short and long
term (Bradley 1994; Schacter 1996; Wagenaar and Groeneweg 1990; Wit-
vliet 1997; see also Wood 2003). Once I had developed an event-based
understanding of each woman’s situation before and during the war, I
followed with more general questions intended to elicit narrativeaccounts
of her mobilization experience (What is your earliest memory of the war?
How is it that you ended up in a guerrilla camp?).
17 Mixing the recall of
events with more open-ended narrativequestionsprovedeffective;women
consistently cited one of three general motivations to justify their partic-
ipation in the FMLN guerrilla army, and women in each motive category
were distinguished by a unique set of objective experiences. The fact that
more subjective reports of motivations dovetailed with previously stated
and highly objective reports of major life events suggests that particular
experiences and relationships were indeed more likely to promoteguerrilla
mobilization than others.
18
To address the second concern, the issue of causal order, I hypothesized
which present-day identities and experiencesmightaffectmyrespondents’
reports of past motivations for participation. For example, I anticipated
that women who continue to associate with the FMLN, which is now a
political party, might remember positive reasons for mobilization, while
women who express disillusionment with the present-day FMLN may
explain past participation as forced. To investigate this possibility, I coded
my respondents according to a number of measures of their present-day
views of the FMLN (who received material beneﬁts because of their
guerrilla participation, who votes for the FMLN, who identiﬁes the
FMLN as their preferred party, who reports “growing personally”because
17 A narrative style is most compatible with how autobiographical knowledge is struc-
tured (Belli, Shay, and Stafford 2001; Brown and Schopﬂocher 1998).
18 Retrospective data about the occurrence of past events are generally considered
reliable and valid. However, the details and dates surrounding those events are some-
times less easily remembered. I put dates on each reported biographical event by
employing my knowledge of local history and other events in the respondents’ lives.
For example, if the respondent recalled ﬂeeing to a refugee camp after her village was
massacred, but could not recall the exact year, then I used ofﬁcial accounts of the
massacre to put an exact date on her escape. If the respondent was unsure what years
she participated in a particular organization, I asked if she remembered bringing her
children with her to the meetings, and which children were there. Then I could use
the age of the children to estimate her years of attendance. Asking if events occurred
before or after a particular massacre, the paving of the community road, the arrival
of electricity, the killing of Archbishop Romero, etc., also helped put a timeline on
each individual’s biography.Women’s Mobilization
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of their wartime participation, who says their life is better because of the
war). I then examined the correlations between these present-day mea-
sures and my three mobilization paths (discussed below). No signiﬁcant
correlations were found, suggesting that the mobilization patterns I iden-
tify cannot be explained by present-day patterns in my respondents’ feel-
ings toward the FMLN.
I repeated this search for meaningful correlations by analyzing my
respondents’ communities of origin, civil statuses, more general political
beliefs, measures of gendered identities, and present-day political and
community activities. Again, none of these present-day measures was
signiﬁcantly correlated with any of the identiﬁed mobilization paths. Nei-
ther did I ﬁnd any signiﬁcant relationship between reported mobilization
and the amount of time that each respondent actually lived and worked
in guerrilla camps. In total, I found one signiﬁcant correlation. Women
who mobilized as politicized guerrillas are more likely to be present-day
community leaders (Spearman’s ), suggesting that the present- r p .421
day identity of “leader” might inﬂuence the way that mobilization is re-
membered.
19 (I discuss the theoretical and empirical ramiﬁcations of this
possibility in n. 30 in the conclusion.) In general, however, women’s mo-
bilization narratives do not appear to be inﬂuenced in patterned ways by
present-day social contexts or wartime experiences.
VARIABLES
The dependent variable, wartime participation, identiﬁes three levels of
activism in relationship to the FMLN: guerrillas, collaborators, and non-
participants. These are described in table 1. In my sample, 38 women are
guerrillas, 12 are collaborators, and 32 are nonparticipants.
The independent variables measure each woman’s objective conditions
of mobilization. They include three measures of network ties prior to
mobilization (previous organizational involvement, family ties with guer-
rillas, living in a refugee camp or repopulated community), threemeasures
of biographical availability (motherhood, family completeness, age at mo-
bilization), and one measure of changing situational context (time of
mobilization).
Networks.—The literature highlights two networks as crucial for mo-
bilizing individuals into guerrilla armies: family ties with guerrillas and
relational ties generated through membership in organizations working
19 Of course, the causal arrow could also arguably point the other direction; women
who mobilized politically into the guerrillas in the past may be more likely to become
community leaders in the present. If this were the case, it would do little to undermine
my classiﬁcation of mobilization motives into these three patterns.TABLE 1
Specifying the Variables
Variable Speciﬁcation
Dependent variable (wartime participation):
Guerrilla Respondent lived and worked in or alongside an
FMLN guerrilla camp as a primary, permanent
residence, usually for a period of years, but for
at least six months.
Collaborator Respondent maintained a household as a primary
residence, but held a formally deﬁned role of
support for the guerrilla camps. Support roles in-
clude but are not limited to making frequent
trips to camps to deliver supplies and intelli-
gence information; assisting with intelligence
gathering, weapons preparation, or sabotage ef-
forts; or allowing home to be used as guerrilla
“safe house.” Collaboration is highly dangerous
work, but does not require a sacriﬁce of home
and family.
Nonparticipant Respondent maintained a household as a primary
residence and did not hold any formal positions
of support for the guerrilla. She may have sym-
pathized with the guerrilla movement or helped
on occasion, but this relationship was never
formalized.
Independent variables (factors motivating or inhibiting guerrilla participation):
Network ties:
Previous organizational
involvement
The respondent reported participation in a political
or religious organization that advocated reforms
similar to those advocated by the FMLN guer-
rilla organization. For guerrillas, the organiza-
tional involvement must predate guerrilla activ-
ism. For nonguerrillas, any organizational
involvement prior to or during the war is
included.
Family ties The respondent had a mother, father, sibling, part-
ner, or child who was active in the FMLN as a
collaborator or guerrilla. For guerrillas, the fam-
ily participation must predate or begin simulta-
neously with her activism. For nonguerrillas, any
family participation prior to or during the war is
included.
Refugee/repopulated
community
The respondent lived in a refugee camp or a repo-
pulated community. Guerrillas must have lived
in the refugee camp or repopulated community
at the moment of mobilization. Nonguerrillas
must have lived in a refugee camp or repopu-
lated community at some point during the war.Women’s Mobilization
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TABLE 1 (Continued)
Variable Speciﬁcation
Biographical availability:
Motherhood For guerrillas, the respondent had children at the
moment of mobilization into the FMLN. For
nonguerrillas, the respondent had children prior
to or during the war.
Family completeness For guerrillas, the respondent lived with both her
parents at the moment of mobilization into the
guerrillas, or if she had already left the home of
her parents, then the respondent’s partner was
present in the home at the moment of mobiliza-
tion into the guerrillas. For nonguerrillas, the re-
spondent had a complete family during the en-
tire length of the war.
Age at mobilization For guerrillas only: the respondent’s age at the mo-
ment she was mobilized into the guerrilla army.
Situational context:
Mobilization period For guerrillas only: the respondent’s mobilization
into the FMLN either occurred early in the war
(1980–83) or late in the war (1985–91).
for social change (Dodson and O’Shaugnessy 1985; Kampwirth 2002;
Va ´zquez et al. 1996; Wickham-Crowley 1992). To these, I add the ex-
perience of living in a refugee camp or a repopulated community. This
has not been mentioned as a mobilizing factor for women guerrillas.How-
ever, given that 1.5 million rural Salvadorans, or 20% of the total Sal-
vadoran population, were displaced from their homes by 1983 (Commis-
sion on the Truth 1993), and given the documented political organizing
that occurred within refugee camps (Cagan and Cagan 1991; Va ´zquez
2000), this is an important area for investigation.
Biographical availability.—Young women with no children and a miss-
ing parentathomeareexpectedtohavethefewestbarrierstoparticipation
(Kampwirth 2002; see also Vilas 1986). Children are barriers because their
needs limit the work a woman may perform outside the home. Parents
are barriers because they may prevent their children from joining the
guerrillas. However, some scholars suggest that motherhood encourages
women to mobilize because their position as caretaker of the family mo-
tivates them to create a better world for future generations (Reif-Lobao
1986, 1998; Mason 1992; Va ´zquez et al. 1996).
Mobilization period.—The pervasiveness of state-sponsored violence
varied greatly during the civil war. In the early years (1980–83), repression
was widespread and indiscriminate, and opportunities to escape the vi-
olence were few. The Salvadoran Armed Forces, in their attempts toAmerican Journal of Sociology
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squelch civilian support for the nascent FMLN guerrilla organization,
adopted a “scorched earth” policy. This included indiscriminatemassacres
of rural peasants, air attacks on rural communities, burning homes and
crops, and killing livestock. The number of civilian deaths in 1982 alone
was estimated at nearly 6,000, or three times the number of deaths among
guerrilla combatants (Commission on the Truth 1993). In 1984, repression
decreased momentarily in conjunction with talks of civilian elections and
peace negotiations, but military activity on both sides increased again
from 1985 to 1991. Unlike the earlier period of war, however, repression
in the latter period was less prevalent and more discriminate. The gov-
ernment’s scorched earth campaigns had been halted by international
political pressure and the general ineffectiveness of the tactic, and inter-
national aid had provided civilians with a means to escape the violence;
tens of thousands of rural Salvadorans were now living in refugee camps,
mostly in Honduras, or were later moved to FMLN-sponsored “repo-
pulated” communities well within guerrilla-controlled territory.
20 I oper-
ationalize this changing context of repression by determining whether
a woman was mobilized early in the war (1980–83) or late in the war
(1985–91). None of my respondents was mobilized in 1984, the year when
peace brieﬂy seemed possible. The measurement of all variables is given
in table 1.
THE CONVENTIONAL MODEL OF WOMEN’S GUERRILLA
MOBILIZATION
Scholars of women’s guerrilla mobilizations ﬁnd that women join rebel
armies when they are biographically available, already active in orga-
nizations with similar goals and ideologies, have family members active
in the revolutionary movement, and are forced to abandon their peaceful
protest activities because of government-sponsored repression. Table 2
demonstrates the inability of this one pattern to explain most women’s
mobilization into guerrilla armies when a representative sample of both
participants and nonparticipants is used. Similar numbers of guerrillas
and nonguerrillas were mothers, were missing a parent or spouse, and
had family members active in the movement. Neither did my added var-
iable, living in a refugeecamp, effectivelydistinguishbetweenparticipants
and nonparticipants. Only one of the presumed factors in guerrilla mo-
20 In 1986, Salvadoran refugees in Honduran refugee camps successfully bargained
with the Salvadoran government for repatriation rights and assistance. Over the next
few years, they returned to El Salvador in groups and settled on abandoned land in
guerrilla-controlled territory. These communities were generally highly sympathetic to
the FMLN and somewhat protected from hostilities by their location.Women’s Mobilization
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TABLE 2
Bivariate Correlations (Spearman’s r) between Selected Mobilization
Characteristics and Women’s Guerrilla Participation
Guerrillas Nonguerrillas Spearman’s r
Network ties:
Previous organizational involvement (%) ... 39.5 15.9 .265**
Family ties to guerrillas (%) .................. 81.6 81.8 .003
Refugee camp/repopulation (%) .............. 42.1 59.1 .183
Biographical availability:
Motherhood (%) ............................... 31.6 48.5
a .173
Family completeness (%) ...................... 31.6 43.2 .129
Mean age at time of interview ............... 36.9 36.9
Age range at time of interview ............... 24–73 23–66
Mean age at mobilization ..................... 19.2
Age range at mobilization .................... 7–60
Situational context:
Early mobilization period N .................. 20
Late mobilization period N ................... 18
Across period N ................................ 38 44
a Eleven women gave birth between 1981 and 1992 and were therefore both mothers and nonmothers
during the war; these 11 were dropped from the motherhood analysis. Age is expressed in years. Np82.
* one-tailed tests P !.05,
** . P !.01
bilization—previous organizational membership—appears signiﬁcant;
more guerrillas than nonguerrillas were previously involved in political
organizations. Regardless, over 60% of the women who became guerrillas
did not have prior organizational involvement, indicating that many
women were mobilized by other processes.
A NEW APPROACH: CAPTURING VARIATION IN MOBILIZATION
The previous analysis demonstrates the inability of conventional “one-
pattern” methods to explain the varied processes by which mobilization
actually occurs. I do not doubt that the networks and barriers identiﬁed
in previous research are central mobilizing factors for women guerrillas.
Rather, I argue that the way these networks and barriers interact for
individual women and within a particular situational context is the key.
I further argue that because the variation in mobilization processes is
patterned, scholars can identify multiple paths to activism while still pri-
oritizing parsimonious explanations. Through analysis of my respondents’
narratives, I found three clear mobilization patterns, which I have labeled
politicized guerrillas, reluctant guerrillas, and recruited guerrillas. Next,
I grouped women according to these three patterns, and I documented
whether speciﬁc combinations of objective factors clustered togetherAmerican Journal of Sociology
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within each category. I also analyzed qualitatively how women discussed
these objective factors within their mobilization narratives. I conclude
that distinct combinations of objective factors consistentlyresultedineach
particular mobilization narrative. I review these analyses below.
Politicized Guerrillas
[I went to the guerrilla camp] to change this country. Because
the government was corrupt and we had to ﬁght.—Pati
21
Politicized guerrillas were pulled into guerrilla participation by their
strongly held beliefs in the political causes of the FMLN. Of the three
mobilization patterns, this is the closest to the “typical” route to guerrilla
activism proposed in the established literature. Politicized guerrillas de-
veloped a salient participation identity through their involvement in po-
litical organizations and then followed guerrilla recruiters to the FMLN
camps. Surprisingly, only seven of the 38 guerrilla women in this study
cite political reasons as their primary motivation for participation.
22
Table 3 reviews the objective conditions of mobilization for politicized
guerrillas, with “X” indicating the presence of a variable. Looking ﬁrst
at the networks, each politicized guerrilla was previously involved in a
political or religious organization that facilitated their recruitment into
the FMLN.
So when the women of AMES (Association of Salvadoran Women) held
their meetings, I went. And when they said that whoever wanted to go to
the guerrilla camps should raise their hand, well, I said me too. So fourteen
of us, young girls, left together. . . . We said “we’re going to go!” They told
us that they were going to have a party to swear us in, so they swore us
in and put the bandana of the FMLN around our left arm, since we’ve
always been people of the left, they put the bandana here . . . then they
sent us off for some short training courses.—Alicia
We began to work in this ORMUSA, this group of women that worked in
the communities raising crops, talking to the people, [ﬁnding out] what they
needed, if they were sick, healthy. I was part of the board of directors of
ORMUSA. . . . We worked a while and then we started coordinating with
the people who worked in the clandestine. . . . Once you’re involved in
this it is difﬁcult to leave.—Zoila
21 All names are pseudonyms, and all translations are my own.
22 The small number of guerrillas in this category may be attributed to their early entry
into the war and their dedication to the causes of the war. It may be that politicized
guerrillas were in the war for longer periods of time and took part in more dangerous
types of guerrilla activities than women in other categories, so fewer politicized guer-
rillas may have survived the war to be included in my study.Women’s Mobilization
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Politicized guerrillas were also embedded in family networks that sup-
ported guerrilla activism. Family ties to revolutionary activists are not
speciﬁc to politicized guerrillas, but the qualitative data suggest that the
depth of political activism of these family members is exceptional. For
example, Alicia’s father was a founding member of FECCAS (Christian
Federation of Salvadoran Peasants), one of the largest and mostimportant
of all peasant political groups. Estela’s parents joined forces with the
Catholic Church to demand and win restitution when the government
ﬂooded the land on which they worked for wages. Vilma, Zoila, and Pati
participated in political or religious organizations with other members of
their families.
FMLN commanders also indicate that organizational and family ties
were key vehicles for recruiting guerrillas, especially during the early
period of the war. Designated recruiters targeted existing organizations
as a means of appropriating networks already sympathetic to the FMLN
cause, as well as to ensure that the new recruits could be trusted not to
reveal the identity of clandestine FMLN sympathizers to the Salvadoran
Armed Forces. New recruits were then sent through a political education
program designed with easily accessible language for poorly educated
rural peasants. “At the very least we wanted to make sure they were clear
on the most basic elements of why we were ﬁghting the war,” stated one
commander.
The biographical characteristics of politicized guerrillas are not as cen-
tral to mobilization as the network variables. The only consistent biog-
raphy is complete family. Six of the seven report having lived with both
parents or with their spouse at the time of mobilization. This is unex-
pected; complete families are hypothesized as barriers to participation.
The depth offamily members’participationinpoliticalactivity(seeabove)
may account for this seeming contradiction. The other biographical mea-
sures are inconsistent. Most politicized guerrillas mobilized in their mid-
to-late teens, but some mobilized much later in life. Moreover, ﬁve po-
liticized guerrillas were not mothers at the time of mobilization, but two
overcame the barrierofmotherhood tojointheguerrillaarmy.Zoilajoined
after her two children had grown and left home (one had joined the
FMLN). Pati joined with her husband and their two children (ages ap-
proximately 7 and 9). In her interview, she states that she wanted her
children to learn of the necessity of social struggle. These two cases give
tentative support to previous ﬁndings that strong participation identities
may overcome biographical barriers to participation.
While biographical factors vary, the situational context of politicized
guerrillas is similar; most mobilized in the early 1980s when repression2
2
TABLE 3
Objective Conditions of Mobilization for Women Guerrillas by Mobilization Category
Respondent
Age at
Mobilization
Year of
Mobilization Motherhood
Complete
Family
Refugee
Camp
Previous
Organizational
Involvement
Family
Members
Active
Politicized guerrillas:
Vilma ............. 16 1981 X X X
Alicia .............. 16 1981 X X X
Estela ............. 16 1980 X X X
Pati ................ 26 1980 X X X X
Zoila .............. 42 1989 X X X X
Gregoria .......... 13 1980 X X
Gloria ............. 16 1980 X
Reluctant guerrillas:
Julia ............... 7 1976 X
Claudia ........... 15 1983 X
Maria ............. 13 1983 X
Y enifer ............ 11 1981 X X
Blanca ............ 17 1983 X X
Juana ............. 60 1989 X X X
Gladis ............. 35 1980 X X X
Lulu ............... 34 1981 X X X
Angela ............ 24 1981 X X X
Margarita ......... 29 1983 X X X X
Mirna ............. 23 1982 X X
Rosmaria ......... 28 1981 X X
Yaniris ............ 21 1980 X
Andrea ............ 43 1983 X X2
3
Recruited guerrillas:
Minta ............. 12 1985 X X X
Sury ............... 12 1985 X X X
Rosa ............... 18 1983 X X X X
Rebecca ........... 11 1988 X X X
Candelaria ........ 13 1989 X X X
Magaly ............ 16 1991 X X
Dolores ............ 15 1987 X X
Marta ............. 14 1985 X X
Marlene ........... 8 1986 X X
Lupe .............. 15 1988 X X
Elsy ............... 11 1987 X X
Bellini ............. 11 1985 X X
Lorena ............ 14 1987 X X
Amarenta ......... 15 1991 X
Yamileth .......... 16 1987 X
Aracely ............ 12 1987 X
Leonora ........... 13 1986 XAmerican Journal of Sociology
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was beginning to escalate.
23 Several politicized guerrillas mentioned the
general hostile environment as a motivator for guerrilla participation, but
none report being targeted for repression because of their organizational
involvement. This differs from previous studies that suggest government
repression forced peaceful activists to take their politics underground.
In sum, politicized guerrillas were pulled into the FMLN early in the
war because they were already embedded in organizational and familial
networks of activism. The catalyst moving peaceful activists into guerrilla
camps appears to be that these networks were targeted by guerrilla re-
cruiters, and not by state repression. In several instances, the salience of
the participation identity generated through these networks overcame the
potential biographical barriers of motherhood and older age.
Reluctant Guerrillas
In this war, you don’t get involved because you want to, but
because you have to. Because if you don’t, they kill you. Even
though you didn’t know anything about the war.—Julia
The 14 women classiﬁed as reluctant guerrillas were pushed into the
guerrilla camps because a crisis left them with no other options. Their
stated motivations focus on government repression, a need to ﬂee hostil-
ities, and a lack of resources for escaping to any other safe location.
It wasn’t that I wanted to go to the mountain, but like they say, el amor
a la vida es grande [the love of life is strong]. And even though you might
be suffering, if you’re alive . . . —Lulu
Most crises that motivated the reluctant guerrillas to mobilize with the
FMLN involved generalized violence against entire villages:
I remember one time they (presumably members of the revolutionary move-
ment) came and showed us a “butido.” Butido is what they called this hole
they had made, under the ground. Yes. So, they had a big meeting . . . we
went, because this was a precaution for when the armed forces arrived,
they said that we would get in there, because this thing had a long ven-
tilation shaft, but the next day I was captured with my mom. . . . And so
we didn’t have the opportunity . . . well, nobody had the opportunity, to
go to that place and hide and be free. That was when, this (military) op-
eration was when all the people in this place died.—Yenifer
23 Zoila is the only politicized guerrilla mobilized late in the war. Nevertheless, she
had been an active guerrilla collaborator and community leader since 1983 and made
the move into the guerrilla camps in 1989 immediately prior to the FMLN “ﬁnal
offensive.”Women’s Mobilization
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They warned . . . they told us . . . one hears things . . . the plane, circling
and circling, we knew that something was coming by land, and they told
us, let’s go, because the enemy is coming near, they said . . . before the
massacre. They got us out . . . and the rest of the people they weren’t able
to get out because (the lake) was full of “lettuce” (green leafy water plants
that prohibit passage by boat). . . . That’s why they were left behind.—
Andrea
Nevertheless, two cases involved violence targeted speciﬁcally against the
respondent and her family:
When I realized that my spouse was involved [with the guerrillas], because
I didn’t know before, was when they started “putting the ﬁnger on us”
[identifying us as subversives], and then the army would arrive and inter-
rogate us. The people knew that I was married and that hewas myhusband,
and so every day the soldiers would arrive and I would tell them the same
thing. And then they began to interrogate my father, and the next day my
father told me that we should get out of there, so we waited for the clean
clothes to dry and the next day we left there because they were going to
kill us. A letter from my husband arrived saying that they were going to
kill us, so I left with my little suitcase and my child. . . . My husband told
me that I should go to the camp, because there we could have a separate
life, where the army would not ﬁnd us.—Mirna
The objective conditions shared by reluctant guerrillas are documented
in table 3. Network ties are inconsistent among women who cite a crisis
as their motivation for mobilization. Nearly halfwereinvolvedinprevious
organizational activities, but none invoked these activities when telling
of their decision to move to the guerrilla camp. Moreover, most of those
reporting previous organizational activity (ﬁve out of six) were mothers,
suggesting that these politically active women were perhaps inhibited
from earlier guerrilla activity because of the biographical barrier of young
children; they only entered the guerrilla camp when a crisis made it un-
avoidable.
24 Nearly all reluctant guerrillas had family members working
with the FMLN, and at least six of them went to the guerrilla camps at
the moment of crisis because they were seeking family members already
living there. Network ties therefore may not have motivated activism,
but they may have provided a resource for escaping government repres-
sion into an FMLN camp.
Biographically, reluctant guerrillas are diverse. Crises, it seems, pushed
all biographical categories of women (older and younger, mothers and
24 None of the politically involved reluctant guerrillas suggested that they were spe-
ciﬁcally targeted by repression because of their activities as suggested in the current
literature. Rather, they were members of villages that came under indiscriminate state
violence.American Journal of Sociology
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nonmothers) into the guerrilla camps. Nevertheless, the qualitative data
indicate that young, childless reluctant guerrillas had additional difﬁculty
escaping guerrilla mobilization in times of crisis. Yenifer (quoted above)
was captured by the Salvadoran Armed Forces when her village was
attacked, and she and her mother were forced to cook and do laundry
as they traveled with the soldiers for 30 days. When the military operation
ended and the soldiers withdrew from the region, they were set free, but
they feared remaining in their decimated and abandoned community. The
FMLN offered her mother and sister escort to the refugee camp, but
Yenifer stayed behind in the guerrilla camps. When I asked why she, too,
did not go to the refugee camp, she responded:
Yenifer: Because I was already about 11 years old and I couldn’t go to
the refugee camp because the Honduran soldiers would rape young girls.
Interviewer: But your sister went, didn’t she?
Yenifer: Yes, but she already had a child, my niece, in her arms. The baby
was about 5 months old, something like that.
Interviewer: But why a guerrilla camp, at 11 years old?
Yenifer: Because we couldn’t just ask to live. If it wasn’t the guerrillas,
it was the Armed Forces. Because you see, here, if I stay, the Armed
Forces kill me. If I go where the Armed Forces are in control, the guer-
rillas will kill me. That’s why I went. What’s more, the Armed Forces
had killed nearly all our family, so I certainly couldn’t follow them.
Interviewer: And you thought that it was safer to join the guerrillas than
to go to a refugee camp?
Yenifer: Yes! [with conviction] Since the very same guerrillas had taken
my mother out of the house and to the refugee camp, since she could no
longer live there, then I had to go to live with the guerrilla combatants.
I couldn’t stay in the house or in any other area that wasn’t the guerrillas.
Interviewer: Who said that the Honduran soldiers would rapeyoung girls?
Yenifer: Everyone said so.
The case of Blanca represents the only young reluctant guerrilla who
lived with both her parents at the time of crisis. She is also the only
reluctant guerrilla who lived near the Honduran border at the time of
crisis. These resources of family ties and proximity to a refugee camp
nearly allowed her to mediate the crisis of villagewide displacement by
ﬂeeing to a Honduran refugee camp under FMLN escort.
25 When she
arrived at the Honduran border, however, the FMLN escorts singled
Blanca out and told her to return to the war zone with them:
Blanca: Because they didn’t let us in, we had to stay here; they only took
25 The FMLN frequently escorted civilian populations, both supporters and nonsup-
porters, out of the conﬂict zones and to the Honduran border where the civilians could
then make a run for the nearby refugee camp.Women’s Mobilization
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the little kids, up to 9 or 10 years old. Those who were already 14 or 15
they left here.
Interviewer: Who didn’t let you enter [the refugee camp]?
Blanca: Those that were in charge up there, those that were in charge of
getting the people out [of the war zones], because I was going to go with
my mama and they sent me back to the border. From there they said,
“This one is going to go with us,” all of the people went up there, and
all of the girls they sent back, they only let the old people and the little
children stay.
Intrigued by the selection process, I had several informal conversations
with my respondents about who granted refugee camp entrance, andwhat
the entrance requirements were. I was told that the FMLN did indeed
prevent young women from entering Honduran refugee camps, but only
for the women’s protection. Honduran soldiers reportedly accused all
youthful women seeking refuge of being “guerillas” and denied their en-
trance into the camps, at times imprisoning, raping, or even killing them
(I have since searched for conﬁrmation that Honduran soldiers raped
young females seeking refuge, and have not found any). I then questioned
how the many women I had interviewed, who actually lived and worked
in guerrilla camps, were able to leave the guerrilla camps for refugee
camps when they became pregnant. These actual guerrillas apparently
gained entrance without difﬁculty. “Of course,” responded Gregoria, her-
self a guerrilla who gained entrance into a refugee camp while pregnant.
“Young women were ‘guerrillas,’ but a pregnant woman, she had become
a ‘mother.’” These informal discussions provide further support for the
idea that crisis, when combined with perceived biographical availability,
made it very difﬁcult for reluctant guerrillas to avoid mobilization despite
their unwillingness to participate. Moreover, reluctant guerrillaswhowere
mothers of young children were all eventually transferred to refugee
camps, while reluctant guerrillas who were not mothers were expected to
stay in the guerrillas unless, as in the case of Blanca, they, too, became
pregnant.
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The case of reluctant guerrillas complicates the role of biography in
the mobilization process. Young women, and women who were not moth-
ers, had fewer options to escape activism than did older women who were
mothers. Thus, biography not only inﬂuences an individual’s internally
held identity, it also inﬂuences the identity assigned to that individual by
26 Many women who were childless when they joined the FMLN eventually left the
guerrilla camps for the security of the refugee camps upon becoming pregnant. Several
of my respondents even suggested that some women purposefully got pregnant when
they tired of life in the guerrilla camp, as this guaranteed them safe escort to a refugee
camp or repopulated community and a legitimate reason for exiting the ﬁght for social
justice.American Journal of Sociology
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others. An external expectation of who “should” become a guerrillalimited
the options available to young, childless women in wartime El Salvador.
The situational context of mobilization for reluctantguerrillaswaschar-
acterized by extreme repression. Most went to guerrilla camps very early
in the war when state violence was at its worst and knowledge of refugee
camps was limited. Joining forceswithoneofthewarringpartiesappeared
to be the only means for survival. Most reluctant guerrillas did not appear
to have other ﬁnancial or network resources that might have allowed
them to avoid guerrilla activism.
In sum, reluctant guerrillas were pushed into the guerrilla camps be-
cause they did not have the necessary networks or resources to escape a
crisis by any other means. Network ties were not the impetus for mobi-
lization, but they may have provided reluctant guerrillas an opportunity
to escape massacres in their villages by ﬂeeing to FMLN camps. Neither
do biographical characteristics effectively distinguish reluctant guerrillas
from others, although certain biographies did apparently limit some
women’s ability to not participate. Women who were young and childless
were at times not allowed entrance into refugee camps because they ﬁt
an external role expectation of who “should” be a guerrilla. This concept
of an external role expectation, unexplored in current mobilization lit-
erature, gains further relevance in the following section.
Recruited Guerrillas
[When I joined the guerrillas], I didn’t have an objective, noth-
ing more than seeing what it was like in the guerrillas, to have
an adventure, nothing more.—Magaly
Recruited guerrillas lived in a refugee camp or a repopulated community,
were speciﬁcally targeted by FMLN recruiters, and were persuaded to
join the movement. They cite two common motivations. The ﬁrst is the
desire to have an adventure in the guerrillas. “I wanted to go,” said
Candelaria. “When you’re young, you don’t know why you go, you go
because you see the rest in uniform, I guess.” The second motivation is
a desire for retribution. “I felt the desire,” reported Elsy. “Like they say,
I’m going to avenge myself, right, of all that they did to my family. . . .
I wanted to ﬁght like my father had fought. I wanted to defend, I wanted
to release all of the bad that had happened to me.” Lupe expressed a
similar motivation. “We had always said that when we were big enough
we were going to avenge the blood of my father and my sisters, and we
did it.” Recruited guerrillas’ motivations differed from those of politicized
guerrillas because they emphasized personal reasons (adventure and ret-
ribution) over more generalized political reasons (asenseofjustice,seekingWomen’s Mobilization
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political change). Recruited guerrillas’ motivations differed from those of
reluctant guerrillas because they chose to join the FMLN from therelative
safety of a refugee camp and did not feel forced to join because of their
situation.
With one exception, recruited guerrillas share a common network that
facilitated their mobilization: they all lived in the conﬁned community
of a refugee camp or an FMLN-supported repopulation.
27 This all-
encompassing network was strongly inﬂuenced by the FMLN; guerrillas
or guerrilla supporters ran schools, organized protests,andevenfacilitated
the transfer of supplies to FMLN combatants. Women living in refugee
camps or repopulations were therefore frequently exposed to FMLN ide-
ology and subjected to explicit invitations to join the guerrillas.
In the refugee camp, they would call together a big group of girls. They
taught us politics, and said that we had to come and ﬁght here with the
Frente. There were political meetings, in school, that’s where they prepared
us [for the guerrillas].—Dolores
They arrived there and called together the people to talk about the motive
of the war, what needed to be done. Of course they gave courses to motivate,
to say that we had to ﬁght, that we had to win this war. So you get
animated—maybe with some little lies on their part, maybe—they would
get you excited and you would come. Because of this a great number of
adolescents left.—Marta
[The recruiters would come up to small groups of young women] and they
would say to us: Bichas [young girls], don’t you want to go and participate
with us guerrillas? Yes!!! We’re going to go!!! we said. We thought it was
a real big thing, you know?—Candelaria
The effects of other network variables are not consistent (table 3). Only
two of the seventeen had participated in prior organizational activities,
and the respondents highlight networks of friends and schoolmates more
often than familial networks in their mobilization narratives. These net-
works were easily and often targeted by FMLN recruiters within the
conﬁnes of a refugee camp.
Biographically, recruited guerrillas were young, and all but one were
27 Leonora did not live in a refugee camp or repopulation, but she did live in a com-
munity that was situated very near an FMLN base camp and subject to FMLN
recruitment. She reports that “unos muchachos” from the FMLN camp would arrive
often to talk with them about the war, and she remembers being especially motivated
by the stories of the strong women living in the camps. She eventually decided to join
the guerrillas.American Journal of Sociology
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childless.
28 Most had incomplete families. These biographies (no children
to care for, fewer parents to prohibit guerrilla mobilization) certainly sug-
gest few barriers to participation. Yet, as with reluctant guerrillas, bi-
ography also affected mobilization processes by determining whether
women were perceived by the FMLN as potential participants and sub-
sequently targeted for recruitment. To illustrate, refugee camp living tech-
nically freed mothers for guerrilla participation by providing food, edu-
cation, health care, and day care services for young children, yet mothers
were not generally invited to participate. Moreover, young refugeewomen
who had lost a parent were signiﬁcantly more likely to be targeted for
recruitment than young refugee women with complete families.
29 Re-
cruiters may have targeted women with incomplete families because they
were perceived as having fewer barriers to participation, and also because
they were perceived as most susceptible to recruitment messages framed
around retribution (many parents were missing because they had been
murdered by the Salvadoran Armed Forces). Biography thereforenotonly
affects internally held identity, it also shapes the external role expectation
of who “should” become a guerrilla.
Recruited guerrillas shared a highly homogenous situational context.
All were mobilized in the latter part of the war and, for the most part,
did not fear indiscriminate violence from the government armed forces.
However, according to an FMLN commander, this time period also saw
an expansion in the FMLN recruitment efforts:
When I arrived to El Tigre and was responsible for that zone, we had 114
combatants, including the personnel in supplies, medicine, explosives, prop-
aganda, and the kitchen. When the war ended, we had nearly the same
28 Although the ages of mobilization may seem extraordinarily young, interviews with
commanders indicate that children as young as eight or nine were frequently active
in the guerrilla camps. One female commander stated, “Nobody could live without
their correı ´tos” (little messengers). The one recruited guerrilla who had a child, Rosa,
arrived at the refugee camp at age 18. Her compan ˜ero had stayed behind to ﬁght with
the guerrillas. When asked why she left the refugee camp to join the guerrillas, she
said, “The commander practically obligated me to go,” and then adds, “and I wanted
to ﬁnd out if my compan ˜ero was still alive.” She left her child with her mother and
returned to El Salvador to an FMLN camp. She is also the only recruited guerrilla
who was mobilized early in the war, and the only mother recruited from a refugee
camp.
29 Each woman who joined the guerrillas from a refugee camp mentions being spe-
ciﬁcally recruited by a member of the FMLN. Of the 26 women living in refugee
camps who decided not to join the guerrillas, only 3 of the 12 women with complete
families (25%) were invited to join the guerrillas, whereas 7 of the 14 with incomplete
families (50%) received an invitation. The variables “complete family” and “invitation
to join guerrillas” were signiﬁcantly and negatively correlated at the .05 level among
all refugee camp residents (Spearman’s ), indicating that FMLN recruiters r p .306
were speciﬁcally targeting young women with limited parental control.Women’s Mobilization
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number of people, but from the initial group to the ﬁnal group, only 17 of
us survived. One by one, our compas fell and were substituted by others,
and then they fell as well. What we had in the end was like a third gen-
eration. Such human waste forced certain levels of ﬂexibility [in recruitment
practices].
He went on to say that, given the very basic need for bodies, it became
common late in the war to give entrance to “people motivated purely by
the desire for adventure.”
In sum, recruited guerillas were persuaded to leave the refugee camps
for the guerrilla camps by a member of the FMLN. They were not invited
to participate because they shared common ideologies with the guerrillas,
but rather were identiﬁed by their perceived biographical availability.
Recruitment messages were unavoidable and appealed to women’s emo-
tions; all recruitedguerrillasframetheirmobilizationasanefforttoavenge
the death of loved ones or to seek adventure outside refugee camp walls.
In the preceding section, I analyzed the interaction of women’s net-
works, biographies, and situational context in relation to their stated mo-
tivations for guerrilla participation, and I concluded that women followed
three distinct paths to the guerrilla camps. Next, I test these three mo-
bilization paths against my control group of nonguerrillas: collaborators
and nonparticipants.
Comparing Guerrillas and Collaborators
Twelve women in this study collaborated extensively with the FMLN
guerrilla army while maintaining a permanent residence at home. Col-
laborating did not involve all the sacriﬁces of guerrilla participation, but
it was high risk nonetheless. If government soldiers identiﬁed a woman
as a collaborator, she would likely be killed or imprisoned. Most collab-
orators hiked to a nearby guerrilla camp several days per week to cook
for the combatants. Others made food in their homes and then carried
the food to a nearby camp. At times, these women traveled to nearby
communities to buy supplies and leave them at predesignated drop-off
locations. Only two of the 12 collaborators in this study did not provide
direct support to FMLN camps. These two collaborators worked inneigh-
boring countries garnering political support and promises of aid for the
guerrilla movement.
Women cited two reasons for participating as FMLN collaborators.
Most (75%) collaborated because they believed the cause was just. Mag-
dalena, for example, said, “I became aware of the social inequality that
existed,” and Susana stated that “I recognized that it was right, you know,
to do something, even just a little something . . . because I felt it wasAmerican Journal of Sociology
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necessary, you know . . . and it’s a sin not to do what you can do, to
make things better for yourself and for others.”
However, a minority (25%) reports collaborating as a means of survival.
When asked why she and her family collaboratedwiththeFMLN,Marina
responded:
Marina: Because at that time you couldn’t get anything to eat in town.
We only ate bananas, that was the food we had. There was no corn, no
beans, no rice, not even soap. Nothing.
Interviewer: So how did you cook for the guerrillas?
Marina: They brought us the food, because they could getit. Theybrought
everything: corn, rice, beans. Who knows how they did it, but they could
get things.
Interviewer: So you ate better?
Marina: Once we started to support them, yes, they gave us our food.
The objective conditions of collaborators are listed in table 4. Fifty
percent were members of political organizations prior to their guerrilla
collaboration. Few ever lived in refugee camps, and most had family
members active in the guerrillas.
Biographically, collaborators are best divided into two groups: single
mothers and young women with complete families. The ﬁrst group com-
prises seven mothers, four of whom were active in political organizations
before the war. Three were single mothers when the war began, and four
became single mothers when their compan ˜eros joined the guerrillas. Sev-
eral suggested they would have joined the guerrillas were it not for their
children. Susana, for example, said she chose not to live in an FMLN
camp “because I had many little children, I had ﬁve young children, and
so I said ‘No, no I can’t.’ This, yes, makes me feel weak. I didn’t have
the courage to leave the kids somewhere else.”
The second group, young women with complete families, apparently
did not ﬂee to refugee camps because their parents wanted to maintain
their homes and their freedom during the war. They often collaborated
with the guerrillas as a way to survive, but also as a bargaining tool to
keep their daughters out of the guerrilla camps. Several of these young
women stated that they wished to join the FMLN, and in fact were often
recruited by the guerrillas with whom they collaborated. Guerrilla life
seemed more secure than living in war-torn El Salvador. However, the
women’s parents actively and forcefully prevented their mobilization.For
example, Marina’s mother told her that if she were to join the guerrillas,
her family would disown her. Marina joined anyway at age 13, but her
mother used her guerrilla contacts and her pull as a collaborator to ﬁnd
her daughter and have her brought home a mere three months later.
Celestina recalls wanting to join the guerrillas after several frighteningTABLE 4
Objective Conditions of Collaborators and Nonparticipants
Respondent Motherhood
a
Complete
Family
Refugee
Camp
b
Previous
Organizational
Involvement
Family
Members
Active
Collaborators:
Francesca ..... X X X
Eva ........... X X X X
Susana ........ X X X
Tina ........... X X
Griselda ....... X X
Lisa ........... 1984 X X X X
Nina .......... 1984 X X X
Nela ........... X X X X
Celestina ...... X X
Marina ........ X X
Magdalena ... X X X
Deisy ..........
Nonparticipants:
Perona ........ X X X X
Prudencia ..... X X X X
Teresa ......... X X X
Clara .......... X X X
Virginia ....... X X X
Elena ......... X X X
Ines ........... X X X
Norma ........ X X
Nidia .......... X X X
Flor ........... X X X
Erlinda ....... X X
Morena ....... 1986 X X X
Olga ........... 1990 X X X
Daniela ....... 1987 X X X
Cornelia ...... 1986 X X X
Gilda .......... 1989 X (SS) X
Isabela ........ 1985 X (SS) X
Dorotea ....... 1988 X
Doti ........... 1986
Lola ........... 1990
Monica ........ X X X
Feliciana ...... X X X
Adela ......... X X
Concepcion ... X X
Vicenta ........ X X
Orbelina ...... X X
Ancelma ...... X X
Alejandra ..... X (SS) XAmerican Journal of Sociology
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TABLE 4 (Continued)
Respondent Motherhood
a
Complete
Family
Refugee
Camp
b
Previous
Organizational
Involvement
Family
Members
Active
Dina ........... X (SS) X
Nicolasa ...... X
Dora .......... X
Gabriela ......
a In the motherhood category, “X” indicates that the woman gave birth to a child prior to the beginning
of the war in 1980. A date indicates that the woman gave birth during the war. The absence of any
mark indicates that the woman did not give birth before or during the 12 years of war (1980–92).
b (SS) next to an X in the refugee camp section indicates that the individual did not go to a refugee
camp in a neighboring Central American nation, but rather was living in a refugee camp in the capital
city of San Salvador.
encounters with the Salvadoran Armed Forces, but her parents inter-
vened. They invoked their own participation to gain power, telling re-
cruiters that they would continue their collaboration as long as their
daughters were left at home. They reminded recruiters that their two
older sons were guerrillas and claimed, “Two is enough.” Moreover, when
they heard that recruiters were coming to the village, they sent their
daughters to run errands or visit family in other towns.
In sum, collaborators, and especially collaborators who are mothers,
share some mobilization characteristics with politicized guerrillas. A rel-
atively large proportion was involved in previousorganizationalactivities,
and most cited political reasons for their involvement. However, collab-
orating mothers did not take the next step to guerrilla participation be-
cause they had young children at home. Collaborating nonmothers did
not join because they were not living in high recruitmentareaslikerefugee
camps or repopulations, and because they had complete families that
actively prevented their guerrilla mobilization. I also speculate that re-
luctant guerrillas who were mothers and had previous organizational
involvement may have been collaborators had they not been forced into
guerrilla camps by crisis.
Data on collaborators, although not as clearly patterned as data on
guerrillas, highlight how the same mobilization factors (networks, biog-
raphies, and situational context) can have different results in different
combinations. For example, having parents who support the FMLN does
not guarantee that they will also support their child’s participation in the
guerrilla army. The child’s own organizational membership, the parents’
history of organizational membership, and the situational context (here,
absence of crisis, the latter period of the war), are intervening factors.
These data also clarify contradictory viewpoints on the relationship
between motherhood and mobilization. Women who were householdWomen’s Mobilization
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heads, activists, and mothers did support the revolutionary cause, but
typically as collaborators, not as guerrillas. This counters Reif-Lobao’s
(1986, 1998) and Mason’s (1992) claims that these roles, when met with
repression, inspired guerrilla mobilization. Motherhood, and in particular
the presence of young children, was a barrier to guerrilla activism, but
not to guerrilla collaboration.
Comparing Guerrillas and Nonparticipants
The last test of my typology is whether nonguerrillas also share the com-
binations of factors that I argue lead to guerrilla mobilization (table 4).
Unlike politicized guerrillas, few nonparticipants took part in previous
political organizations. Unlike reluctant guerrillas, most nonparticipants
with crises had the necessary resources to reach a refugee camp. At least
ﬁve of the nonparticipants (Nicolasa, Lola, Dorotea, Doti, and Gabriela)
never had to ﬂee a crisis at all and lived in areas less touched by conﬂict.
Unlike recruited guerrillas, most nonparticipants living in refugee camps
had a complete family and did not have a history of political involvement.
The few women in refugee camps who did report incomplete families and
previous organizational involvement did not go to a refugee camp in
Honduras. Rather, they went to refugee camps near the capital city of
San Salvador, where guerrilla recruitment efforts seldom reached. In all,
only ﬁve of the 32 nonparticipants shared similar characteristics with the
recruited guerrillas in that they were young, childless, had incomplete
families, and lived in refugee camps or repopulations. Of these ﬁve, two
were very young at the time of the interview (23 and 24 years old), which
would have lowered their possibilities of recruitment in the late 1980s
when they would have been just 8 or 9 years old. The remaining three
women, Vicenta, Orbelina, and Ancelma, explained their lack of willing-
ness to join the guerrillas as simple fear. They preferred the security of
the refugee camps to the dangers of guerrilla warfare.
Summarizing the Results
In table 5, I list the correlations of each mobilization variable (networks,
biographies, situational context) with each of the three paths to mobili-
zation. The results are consistent with the qualitative analysis. Politicized
guerrillas are signiﬁcantly more likely to have previous organizational
involvement, no refugee camp experience, a complete family, and to mo-
bilize early in the war. Reluctant guerrillas are more likely to be older, to
be mothers, to mobilize early in the war, and, although suffering dis-
placement, are not initially able to enter refugee camps. Recruited guer-
rillas are distinguished by their location in a refugee camp orrepopulation,TABLE 5
Bivariate Correlations (Spearman’s r) between Selected Mobilization Characteristics and Women’s Wartime
Participation Category
Variable
Politicized
Guerrillas
Reluctant
Guerrillas
Recruited
Guerrillas Collaborators Nonparticipants
Networks:
Previous organizational involvement ...... .505** .164 .174 .217* .428**
Family ties ................................... .081 .047 .009 .107 .074
Refugee/repopulated community ........... .319** .474** .436** .123 .273**
Biographical availability:
Motherhood .................................. .074 .252* .385** .088 .119
Complete family ............................. .300** .158 .219* .133 .039
Age of entry .................................. .199 .417** .560**
Situational context:
Mobilization period .......................... .315* .615** .842**
N ................................................. 7 14 17 12 32
* , one-tailed tests. P !.05
** . P !.01Women’s Mobilization
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their biographical availability in terms of age and motherhood, their loss
of a parent, and their late-war mobilization. Neither reluctant nor re-
cruited guerrillas necessitate prior organizational experience for mobili-
zation, and none of the three groups were dependent on family ties for
mobilization. Unlike the initial comparison of guerrillas and nonguerrillas
(table 2), the use of these multiple paths successfully distinguishes guer-
rillas from nonguerrillas, and provides a better understanding of the di-
versity of mobilization experiences among women guerrillas in El
Salvador.
CONCLUSIONS
Using a rare representative sample of activists and nonactivists, I identify
three distinct mobilization patterns that consistently led rural Salvadoran
women to involvement in the FMLN guerrilla army: politicized,reluctant,
and recruited guerrillas. I conclude by discussing the implications of these
ﬁndings for studies of women guerrillas and revolutionary movements
speciﬁcally, as well as for studies of microlevel mobilization processes in
general.
Implications for Research on Women Guerrillas and Revolutionary
Movements
This study improves our understanding of the mobilization processes that
led impoverished women in patriarchal societies to participate in guerrilla
armies. Previous research highlights the importance of networks (prior
organizational involvement and family ties to activists), the absence of
biographical barriers, and a situation of repression. My research conﬁrms
the importance of these factors but enhances our understanding of how
each works individually and in combination with one another.
First, with regard to networks, I ﬁnd that the organizational involve-
ment cited as critical in all previous studies is central to some women’s
mobilization, but not to most. The importance of family ties to activists
is also questioned; nearly all women in war zones, both guerrillas and
nonguerrillas, had close family members serving the FMLN. I add to
existing explanations the critical role of refugee camps as organizational
sites of mobilization for many women guerrillas. The all-encompassing,
totalizing nature of membership in a refugee camp may account for its
particular effectiveness in propelling young, childlesswomenintoguerrilla
armies.
Second, this study reiterates the importance of biography for explaining
women’s guerrilla mobilization. However, the ways in which biographyAmerican Journal of Sociology
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matter are much more complex than the literature suggests. Biography
not only inﬂuences a woman’s internal participation decision, it also
shapes the external role expectation held by powerful others who may
have the ability to inﬂuence, or at times even require, her guerrilla par-
ticipation. In the case of guerrilla activism, young, childless women were
particularly vulnerable to recruitment, while women who were mothers
or who had complete families were often protected from pressures to
participate.
Third, previous conceptualizations of the effects of repression are too
static. Levels and types of repression changed greatly over the course of
the war, and this variation had a direct impact on how, when, and why
women mobilized. Early in the war, repression directly mobilized even
unlikely participants (women, young and old, with and without children,
in patriarchal societies, and with no past political involvement) through
mass dislocation and chaos. Later in the war, repression indirectly mo-
bilized a more select group of women because earlier repressive periods
forcefully forged new networks (within refugee camps and repopulations)
and gave new meaning to existing biographies (young and childless), and
these changes then continued to powerfully shape mobilization processes
long after the repression itself subsided. Yet in contrast with previous
studies, I do not ﬁnd that repression was a catalyst pushing already active
women into the guerrillas. Rather, politically active women appear to
have been pulled into clandestine activism by their already strong par-
ticipation identities.
Finally, whereas previous studies propose one “typical” route to activ-
ism, I ﬁnd that the variable interaction of networks, biographies, and
situational contexts created three distinct paths to guerrilla participation
for rural Salvadoran women. Moreover, the proposed “typical” path, most
closely exempliﬁed by politicized guerrillas, accounted for only a small
portion of the guerrillas I interviewed.
30 By contrast, I ﬁnd that most
30 As noted in the data section, the only signiﬁcant correlation that I found between
present-day attitudes/actions and past mobilization categories was that between the
present-day action of holding a leadership position in the community and the past
category of politicized guerrilla. But establishing the existence of a relationship does
not distinguish causality. Does mobilizing for political reasons in the past make one
more likely to become a community leader in the present? Or does being a present-
day leader make one more likely to remember one’s past mobilization as arising from
political consciousness? If the ﬁrst explanation weretrue,itwoulddolittletoundermine
the politicized guerrilla conﬁguration as a likely causal path to guerrilla participation
and would indicate that at least some women were mobilizedby whatexistingliterature
suggests is the typical path. If the second explanation were true, and present-day
community leaders impose more political consciousness on their past actions than what
was initially there, it would cast further doubt on existing arguments that women’s
guerrilla activism arose out of women’s earlier political activism in other, peacefulWomen’s Mobilization
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women’s mobilization was either directly (reluctant guerrillas) or indi-
rectly (recruited guerrillas) motivated by state-sponsored repression, and
not by previous political participation.
This microlevel ﬁnding has important implications for macrolevel ex-
planations of popular mobilizations. Speciﬁcally, my analysis of women’s
guerrilla mobilization in El Salvador supports and extends Goodwin’s
(2001) model of popular revolutionary activism. In his cross-nationalcom-
parison, Goodwin ﬁnds that repressive state structures mobilize antistate
dissent through their use of indiscriminate violence, and in effect leave
citizens with “no other way out” than revolution (Goodwin 2001). The
experiences of my respondents verify the central role of state-sponsored
repression for generating grassroots mobilization when individuals have
no other way out. But my data further suggest that the more central role
of repression in generating popular mobilization is in creating effective
recruitment environments,andresoundingrecruitmentframes,thatmove-
ment leaders can then use to grow their movement. This recruitment may
actually become most effective after state-sponsored repression subsides
and movement leaders have more and better opportunities to pursue
recruitment activities. Future studies of revolution should take into ac-
count how the changing intensity and motives of state-level repression
may in turn generate new openings for movements’ recruitment efforts.
The macrolevel implications of this study also extend to the mainte-
nance and consequences of revolutionary mobilizations. For example, the
different paths that individuals take to revolutionary mobilizations may
in turn inﬂuence their long-term commitment to the movement. Can un-
willing participants be converted into ideological supporters of the cause
and be encouraged to stay involved, or will they leave their activist role
behind at the ﬁrst opportune moment? Likewise, the current literature
on women revolutionaries continues to debate the consequences of
women’s revolutionary participation for whether women win new rights
under new democracies. Thisstudysuggeststhatwhetherandhowwomen
continue their activism after the war may depend in part on their varied
paths to participation. Will women guerrillas, who mobilizedaroundiden-
tities and frames that were not connected to the traditional gender role
of motherhood, carry their activism forward to new forms of postwar
participation? Or will women who were “pushed” and “persuaded” into
guerrilla participation return to more traditional gender roles once the
war has ended?
organizations. If there is error in my data, that error would likely overestimate the
already small size of the category politicized guerrilla.American Journal of Sociology
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Broader Implications for Studies of Mobilization
The implications of this study extend far beyond women’s guerrilla ac-
tivism and theories of revolutionary change. This study clearly demon-
strates that identifying multiple paths to the same mobilization outcome
is both possible and desirable for many microlevel analyses of
mobilization.
Identifying multiple, conjunctural paths to the same mobilization out-
come is possible. Mobilization is the result of the patterned interaction of
individual-level biography, networks, and situational context. Because
these processes are patterned, scholars can identify the different paths
that individuals follow to participation while still prioritizing parsimo-
nious explanations.
Identifying multiple, conjunctural paths to participation is also desir-
able. I highlight three reasons. First, it rests on solid theoretical foun-
dations. Activists are heterogenous; networks competeforidentitysalience
within individuals; the same situational context affects different individ-
uals differently given their unique biographies and network resources;
networks, biographies, and contexts all shift over the course of a move-
ment. Studies seeking one, generalizedpathtomobilizationcannotcapture
these processes.
Second, this method is desirable because it is empirically more effective
at distinguishing activists from nonactivists, and therefore it is better at
capturing real-world mobilization processes than studies seeking one gen-
eralized mobilization path. Forcing uniformity on what in reality are
distinct processes can generate inaccurate conclusions about whichfactors
matter for mobilization, and even whether certain factors promote or
inhibit activism. In the case of women guerrillas, several critical mobi-
lization factors did not appear to distinguish activists from nonactivists,
when in reality these factors had contradictory effects on mobilization
that could not be ascertained without analyzing that variable in con-
junction with others. For example, living in a refugee camp inhibited
guerrilla mobilization for mothers and for young women with complete
families by isolating them from crises, but it promoted mobilization for
young, childless women who were missing a parent by making them
vulnerable to recruitment. Likewise, complete families signiﬁcantly con-
tributed to the mobilization of politicized guerrillas, because this family
structure was embedded in other networks that prioritized political in-
volvement during a climate of political agitation early in the war. By
contrast, having a complete family later in the war, and especially while
living in a refugee camp or a repopulated area, inhibited mobilization.
Even the role of biographical availability is variable: early in the war,
biography was not as important for mobilization as membership in po-Women’s Mobilization
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litical organizations or being victimized by repression, but later in the
war, biography intersects with new networks and the changing context
to become the critical determinant of recruitment patterns, even among
individuals without prior political experience.
Finally, examining mobilization in a conjunctural manner is desirable
because it extends our knowledge of how each component causal factor
operates within the broader mobilization process. As demonstratedabove,
scholars interested in the effects of repression on mobilization can identify
when, how, and under what circumstances repressionmattersiftheystudy
repression in conjunction with individual biographies, networks, and
changing structural contexts. Likewise, analyses of gender often highlight
the role of motherhood in promoting women’s revolutionary activism, yet
looking at motherhood in conjunction with other mobilization factors
makes clear that the meaning of motherhood varies according to indi-
viduals’ networks, situational contexts, and the changing expectations
placed on the motherhood role by powerful others. Identifying conjunc-
tural paths to mobilization has the potential to deepen our sociological
knowledge of whether and how speciﬁc biographical characteristics (e.g.,
gender, race, class, age, sexuality, etc.), network memberships (e.g., polit-
ical organizations, religious organizations, unions, family ties, neighbor-
hoods, etc.), or changing situational contexts (e.g., democratic transitions,
state repression, increasing globalization, etc.) contribute to popular
mobilization.
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